Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/200138 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2019-207
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for the team outcome, ruling out explanations that team payoff structures drive b ehavior. Analysis of within-team discussions provides insight into the decision-making processes of first and second movers.
Subjects: 
trust game
hidden-action
non-binding communication
teams versus individuals
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
616.12 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.