Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200066
Authors: 
Bodnar, Olivia
Fremerey, Melinda
Normann, Hans-Theo
Schad, Jannika
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 315
Abstract: 
Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterwards, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims decreases cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The overall impact of private damage claims is positive: cartel prevalence declines.
Subjects: 
private damage claims
cartel stability
laboratory experiment
leniency
JEL: 
C90
L41
L44
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-314-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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