Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19896
Authors: 
Hellwig, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004/14
Abstract: 
The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. With asymmetric information about labour productivities and publicgoods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final allocation of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribution, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional models. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation constraints.
Subjects: 
Optimal Income Taxation
Public Goods
Public-Sector Pricing
Multidimensional Mechanism Design
Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing
JEL: 
D82
H20
H40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.