Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198895
Autoren: 
Carroni, Elias
Madio, Leonardo
Shekhar, Shiva
Datum: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7535
Zusammenfassung: 
This article studies incentives for a premium provider (Superstar) to offer exclusive contracts to competing platforms mediating the interactions between consumers and firms. When platform competition is intense, more consumers subscribe to the platform hosting the Superstar exclusively. This mechanism is self-reinforcing as firms follow consumer decisions and (some) join exclusively the platform with the Superstar. Exclusivity always benefits firms and may benefit consumers. Moreover, when the Superstar is integrated with a platform, non-exclusivity becomes more likely than if the Superstar was independent. This analysis provides several implications for managers and policy makers operating in digital and traditional markets.
Schlagwörter: 
exclusive contracts
platforms
two-sided markets
ripple effect
content providers
market power
JEL: 
L13
L22
L86
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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