Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198850
Authors: 
Ursprung, Heinrich
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7490
Abstract: 
I model the strategic interaction between scientists aiming for promotion and a research institution that seeks a highly productive faculty by setting a maternity allowance in the form of a minimum promotion standard. The model shows that maternity allowances need not derive from moral justice arguments but can emerge endogenously from efficiency considerations. The underlying mechanism rests on the assumption that exceptionally productive female professionals are also exceptionally productive if they choose to become mothers. Even though motherhood temporarily handicaps their productivity, it is exactly this cost of motherhood that signals the mothers’ intrinsic high productivity. I explicitly refer to the academic labor market and use empirical evidence from academia to justify the model’s specification, but the conclusions carry over to promotion decisions at the executive level in most professional lines of occupation.
Subjects: 
maternity
job market signaling
fertility
research productivity
highly skilled labor
economics of science
scientometrics
JEL: 
C72
D82
J13
J16
M14
M51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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