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|dc.description.abstract||Over the past 15 years the mutual importance of institutional economics and developmenteconomics have grown strongly. This paper attempts to apply institutional analysis to issuesof economic development by analysing China?s reform process after her accession to theWTO on the background of the hypothesis of vertically dependent institutions. It will beshown that institutions on a lower level (e.g. a fixed exchange rate regime) are dominated byhigher level institutions like (e.g. laws governing firms, financial and labour markets). Thelatter are dominated by institutions on a higher level, for example by regulations governingthe economic and political system. Consequently, economic policy options like a change inthe exchange rate regime will depend on adjustments in areas ranging from constitutional tocompany law.In the second chapter, the concept of hierarchical institutions is introduced. In the thirdchapter, the general results of China?s recent trade liberalisation under WTO rules and theissue of a fixed exchange rate to the US Dollar are recounted. In the fourth chapter, reformsnecessitated by China?s accession to the WTO, and reflected by the present exchange rateregime, are identified. This is followed by the analysis of institutions that are conducive tosuccessful implementation of those reforms in China.||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics |x33||en_US|
|dc.title||Exchange rate risk and economic reform: the case of endogenous institutional change in China||en_US|
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