Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19808
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dc.contributor.authorBlackburn, Keithen_US
dc.contributor.authorForgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:18Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19808-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, incomeinequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamicgeneral equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointedby the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxesand subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflectedin bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich inproviding false information to the government. In accordance withempirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship betweencorruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruptionand development.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 / Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics |x15en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelO11en_US
dc.subject.jelD31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen_US
dc.subject.keyworddevelopment.en_US
dc.titleDistribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernanceen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500755345en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3488-

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