Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19808 
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dc.contributor.authorBlackburn, Keithen
dc.contributor.authorForgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:18Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:18Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19808-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer |cHannoveren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 |x15en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelH26en
dc.subject.jelO11en
dc.subject.jelD31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.keyworddevelopment.en
dc.titleDistribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500755345en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3488en

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