Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197739 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1010
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
We develop an evolutionary game model to reveal the theoretical basis for the assignment of property right, where both plaintiff and defendant argue for their rights by claiming their reliance investment.We allow for the possibility that the value of the total product depend not only on the investment conferred by the owner but also on the reliance investment provided by the trespasser. The resulting evolutionary stable set of preferences shows that the endowment effect hardwired to the ownersand trespassersdepends on the difference of productivities among both parties and the density of owners within the population.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary Game
Property Right
Reliance Investment
Endowment Effect
JEL: 
C73
K11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
353.74 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.