Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197693 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1020
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
I revisit supplier encroachment under the framework of a two-part tariff contract. When a monopoly manufacturer supplies competing retailers and each retailer's contracting process is unobservable to the rival, the retailer's lack of knowledge vis-à-vis its rival's contract may undermine the manufacturer's commitment power, which prevents the manufacturer from achieving optimal profit. I demonstrate that when the manufacturer directly supplies the resale market, it can use the direct channel as a commitment tool and thus restore its market power. Even though the manufacturer's encroachment creates more competitors in the resale market, the resultant higher wholesale prices aggravate double marginalization, which may reduce consumer welfare. This result holds even when the manufacturer is very efficient in direct selling.
Schlagwörter: 
channels of distribution
encroachment
two-part tariff contract
supplier opportunism
consumer welfare
JEL: 
L14
L22
M11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
254.05 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.