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Autoren: 
Cipullo, Davide
Reslow, André
Datum: 
2019
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper 2019:4
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces macroeconomic forecasters as political agents and suggests that they use their forecasts to in uence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the future states of the economy and have to rely on macroeconomic forecasters. The model predicts that it is optimal for forecasters with economic interest (stakes) and in uence to publish biased forecasts prior to a referendum. We test our theory using high-frequency data at the forecaster level surrounding the Brexit referendum. The results show that forecasters with stakes and in uence released much more pessimistic estimates for GDP growth in the following year than other forecasters. Actual GDP growth rate in 2017 shows that forecasters with stakes and in uence were also more incorrect than other institutions and the propaganda bias explains up to 50 percent of their forecast error.
Schlagwörter: 
Brexit
Interest Groups
Forecasters Behavior
Voting
JEL: 
D72
D82
E27
H30
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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