Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197539 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance (JEF) [ISSN:] 1551-9570 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF) [Place:] Montrose, CA [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 1-36
Verlag: 
The Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance (AEF), Montrose, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
Trade credit extended to suppliers in the video game industry does not serve as a commitment device for large customers in determining which vendors to make relationship-specific investments in. Suppliers of video games are better off investing in relationships with trade creditors than seeking out large customers. The costs of large customer relationships are lower sales growth and less long-term debt leverage. Also, large customers don't form relationships with suppliers in this industry, which has high research and development expenditures nor do they facilitate economic viability with regard to continued independent operational performance or listing on a stock exchange.
Schlagwörter: 
trade credit
innovation
relationship-specific investments
suppliers
large customers
economically-linked firms
vertical supply chain
JEL: 
G10
G30
G32
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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