Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197530
Authors: 
Gutmann, Jerg
Voigt, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series 25
Abstract: 
Constitutional democracy is in decline and many would-be autocrats try to elude constitutional constraints or even to exploit constitutions in their favor. We make a number of proposals for designing constitutions that are more resilient against such attempts. A first look at the empirical evidence, however, is sobering. There is little evidence that many appealing constitutional rules are able to increase constitutional resilience.
Subjects: 
constitutional compliance
militant democracy
militant constitutionalism
de jure de facto gap
democratic backsliding
JEL: 
H11
K38
P51
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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