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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series 2 No. 2005,09
Verlag: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
The inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately 1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets. However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
Schlagwörter: 
Mergers
bailout
X-efficiency
multinomial logit
JEL: 
G21
G14
G34
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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