Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19742
Authors: 
Koetter, Michael
Bos, Jaap W. B.
Heid, Frank
Kool, Clemens J. M.
Kolari, James W.
Porath, Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Series 2: Banking and Financial Supervision 2005,09
Abstract: 
The inability of most bank merger studies to control for hidden bailouts may lead to biased results. In this study, we employ a unique data set of approximately 1,000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use data on the regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. We find that, among merging banks, distressed banks had the worst profiles and acquirers perform somewhat better than targets. However, both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than our control group. In fact, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.
Subjects: 
Mergers
bailout
X-efficiency
multinomial logit
JEL: 
G21
G14
G34
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
397.28 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.