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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 817-861
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I study the problem of a durable goods monopolist who lacks commitment power and whose marginal cost of production varies stochastically over time. I show that a monopolist with stochastic costs usually serves the different types of consumers at different times and charges them different prices. When the distribution of consumer valuations is discrete, the monopolist exercises market power and there is inefficient delay. When there is a continuum of types, the monopolist cannot extract rents and the market outcome is efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
Durable goods
Coase conjecture
stochastic costs
dynamic games
JEL: 
D42
C73
C78
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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