Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197197 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 533-554
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between the two game forms. Our analysis also reveals the different roles that the Lebesgue unit interval and a saturated space play in the theory.
Subjects: 
Distributionalized games
individualized games
Nash equilibrium distribution
Nash equilibrium
representation
equivalence
weak equivalence
quasi-equivalence
realization
similarity
symmetry
countability
saturation
JEL: 
C62
D50
D82
G13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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