Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197189
Authors: 
Mezzetti, Claudio
Renou, Ludovic
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 249-285
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regard less of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is 'large' or 'small.'
Subjects: 
Dynamic monotonicity
Nash implementation
Maskin monotonicity
repeated implementation
repeated games
JEL: 
C72
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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