Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197188 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 211-247
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the d omain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation.
Subjects: 
Sequential voting
agendas
manipulation
JEL: 
C72
D02
D71
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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