Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197136
Authors: 
Kojima, Fuhito
Yamashita, Takuro
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 1393-1438
Abstract: 
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and multi-unit demand and supply. We propose a new mechanism that satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, individual rationality, feasibility, nonwastefulness, and no budget deficit. Moreover, this mechanism is asymptotically efficient in that the trade outcome in the mechanism converges to the efficient level as in a competitive equilibrium as the numbers of the buyers and sellers become large. Our mechanism is the first double auction mechanism with these properties in the interdependent values setting.
Subjects: 
Double auction
interdependent values
multi-unit demand and supply
ex post incentive compatibility
asymptotic efficiency
JEL: 
D44
D47
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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