Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19703
Authors: 
Stähler, Nikolai
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2007,26
Abstract: 
In a dynamic model of fiscal policy, social polarization provokes a deficit bias. Policy advisors have recently proposed that governments running a deficit should be forced to generate additional tax revenue. We show that this deficit taxation reduces the deficit bias as it internalizes the externality different lobby groups impose on others. The mechanism described here is not due to the political risk of being elected out of office because the private sector dislikes taxation. Lower government spending and the resulting reduced deficit bias augment capital accumulation.
Subjects: 
fiscal rules
deficit taxation
polarization
capital accumulation
JEL: 
E62
H63
H62
H61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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