Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196814 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12317
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We consider the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, finding evidence of co-dependencies in their votes. Coincident with changes in the party imbalance of the Court over time, sharp discontinuities in these dependencies are evident. Overall, the patterns suggest a tradeoff between co-dependencies around political affiliations and individual ideologies, with more-equal party representation on the Court encouraging greater party awareness in Justice voting, and less-equal party representation allowing Justices across party lines but with similar ideologies to inform each other's votes.
Subjects: 
Supreme Court
voting
judicial behavior
spatial econometrics
JEL: 
D7
K41
C21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.92 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.