Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19681
Authors: 
Stähler, Nikolai
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2007,04
Abstract: 
In theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal.
Subjects: 
employment protection
search and matching models
unemployment
unions
JEL: 
J68
J65
J64
J41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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