Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/196765
Authors: 
Danilov, Anastasia
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 12267
Abstract: 
We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.
Subjects: 
help
relative rewards
team incentives
experiment
JEL: 
M52
J33
J41
L23
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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