Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/196188 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences (PJCSS) [ISSN:] 2309-8619 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Johar Education Society, Pakistan (JESPK) [Place:] Lahore [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 95-103
Publisher: 
Johar Education Society, Pakistan (JESPK), Lahore
Abstract: 
Given the vital role of independent directors in determination of executives' compensation, we explore how independent directors view the CEO pay disparity. Using the data of all companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges for the period 2005 to 2015, we find that the proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively associated with the extent to which executives' pay is dispersed. This finding suggests that independent directors view the dispersion of the CEO's and other executive directors' pay from the managerial power theory perspective rather than from the tournament theory.
Subjects: 
CEO pay disparity
CEO tenure
China
independent directors
managerial power
and state owned firms
tournament incentives
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article

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