Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195932
Authors: 
Vasilev, Aleksandar
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields [ISSN:] 2068-7710 [Volume:] X [Issue:] 1 [accepted] [Year:] 2019
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-convex labor supply decision, unobservable effort, and efficiency wages of the no-shirking type a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). The presence of indivisible labor creates a market incompleteness, which requires that an insurance market for (un)employment be put in operation to "complete" the market.
Subjects: 
Indivisible labor
Lotteries
Unobservable effort
No-shirking
Efficiency wages
Insurance
JEL: 
E1
E22
J41
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

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