Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195919
Authors: 
Breitmoser, Yves
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2019-203
Abstract: 
Li (2017) supports his theoretical notion of obviousness of a dominant strategy with experimental evidence that bidding is closer to dominance in the dynamic ascending clock than the static second-price auction (private values). We replicate his experimental study and add three intermediate auction formats to decompose this behavioral improvement into cumulative effects of (1) seeing an ascending-price clock (after bid submission), (2) bidding dynamically on the clock and (3) getting drop-out information. Li's theory predicts dominance to become obvious through (2) dynamic bidding. We find no significant behavioral effect of (2). However, both (1) and (3) are highly significant.
Subjects: 
strategy proofness
experiments
private value auction
JEL: 
C91
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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