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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Risks [ISSN:] 2227-9091 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-22
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
Audit mechanisms frequently take place in the context of repeated relationships between auditor and auditee. This paper focuses attention on the insurance fraud problem in a setting where insurers repeatedly verify claims satisfied by service providers (e.g., affiliated car repairers or members of managed care networks). We highlight a learning bias that leads insurers to over-audit service providers at the beginning of their relationship. The paper builds a bridge between the literature on optimal audit in insurance and the exploitation/exploration trade-off in multi-armed bandit problems.
Schlagwörter: 
ex-post moral hazard
insurance fraud
optimal auditing
learning
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