Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195683 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Financial Studies [ISSN:] 2227-7072 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-30
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We study the effect of board governance in state-owned and private banks by undertaking a study of commercial banks in India that has both bank groups. Covering a ten-year period from 2003 to 2012 that witnessed a large number of governance reforms in India, the results of our empirical analysis provide evidence of strong ownership effects with board independence exhibiting a significant positive correlation with the performance of private banks and a significant but negative correlation with the performance of state-owned banks. The effect of CEO duality is negative in state-owned banks where incidence of CEO duality is high. We find that a longer CEO tenure has significant positive effects on bank outcomes with these effects strengthening in the later years of CEO tenure. Our results have governance implications for strengthening the composition of board of directors and CEO tenure especially in state-owned banks.
Subjects: 
banks
regulation
ownership
board of directors
CEO duality
CEO tenure
JEL: 
G21
G28
G32
G34
L32
L33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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