Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195560
Authors: 
Fox, Jeremy T.
Lazzati, Natalia
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 8 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 1021-1036
Abstract: 
We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identifica- tion results for the two related models.
Subjects: 
Discrete choice
demand
binary games
identification
bundles
complements
substitutes
entry games
potential games
JEL: 
C14
C35
C57
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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