Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195541 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 277-316
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
There is a potential free-rider problem when several siblings consider future provision of care for their elderly parents. Siblings can commit to not providing long- term support by living far away. If location decisions are made by birth order, older siblings may enjoy a first-mover advantage. We study siblings' location decisions relative to their parents by estimating a sequential participation game for U.S. data. We find (i) limited strategic behavior, that is, in two-child families, more than 92% of children have a dominant strategy, and (ii) a nonnegligible public good problem, that is, in families with multiple children, 18.3% more parents would have had at least one child living nearby had location decisions been made cooperatively.
Subjects: 
Public goods
empirical game
informal care
free-riding
sequential participation game
first-mover advantage
prisoners' dilemma
JEL: 
C72
D13
D62
D64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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