Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195499 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Contemporary Economics [ISSN:] 2300-8814 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] University of Finance and Management in Warsaw, Faculty of Management and Finance [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 383-400
Publisher: 
University of Finance and Management in Warsaw, Faculty of Management and Finance, Warsaw
Abstract: 
The franchisor-franchisee relationship is governed by contracts and trust. This paper analyzes how formal (contracts) and relational (trust) governance mechanisms affected franchisor performance in a service sector franchise for the period 2008-2015. Using the SOM method in the empirical analysis, the results revealed that trust-based governance was more prominent than contract-based governance in the multi-unit franchise network and the cross-franchising network, negatively affecting franchisor performance in the multi-unit franchise network and positively affecting franchisor performance in the cross-franchising network. In contrast, contracts were more prominent than trust in single-unit franchising, negatively affecting franchisor performance. The primary practical implication is that the franchisor should prevent franchisees in the MUF network from opening new outlets in the same city and competing for the existing outlet's customers.
Subjects: 
single-unit franchising
multi-unit franchising
cross-franchising
trust
contract
JEL: 
M13
M31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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