Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/195288 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association [ISSN:] 1869-4195 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 97-112
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
We consider a model of local public goods in a random network context. The influence network determines (exogenously) who observes whom every period and comprises a wide array of options depending on the degree distribution and the in/out-degree correlations. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium level of public good provision and compare it with the efficient level. We derive further insights for this problem by performing a comparative statics analysis.
Subjects: 
Influence networks
Public goods
Out-degree
In-degree
Best-shot game
JEL: 
D85
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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