Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195104
Authors: 
Taleizadeh, Ata Allah
Heydarian, Hossein
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Remanufacturing [ISSN:] 2210-4690 [Volume:] 7 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 49-76
Abstract: 
In this research, a joint pricing and refund optimization problem under cooperative and non-cooperative strategies in a two-stage supply chain consists of a supplier and a manufacturer who produces two types of product; green and non-green is developed. The features of both products in usage and functional are same but in price and environmentally aspect are different. Moreover refund policy is considered for both products that can affect on customers' decision. We explore and analyze the system performance under both non-cooperative and cooperative strategies. The Stackelberg game in cooperative and Rubinstein bargaining in non-cooperative environments are applied respectively. Results show the cooperation of members increase their profits and products demand for both types of products. By increasing the value of potential demand, refund amount of green product and profits in cooperative and non-cooperative cases are increased and refund amount of non-green product is decreased. Changes of utility level sensitivity to the refund amount of green and non-green products have direct relations with refund amount and system profits, unless the utility level sensitivity to the refund amount of non-green product has contrariwise relationship with the refund amount of non-green products.
Subjects: 
Green supply chain
Refund policy
Pricing
Coordination
Hybrid production mode
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.