Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19505
Authors: 
von Hagen, Jürgen
Wolff, Guntram B.
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper Series 1 / Volkswirtschaftliches Forschungszentrum der Deutschen Bundesbank 2004,38
Abstract: 
Fiscal rules, such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact (SGP), aim at constraining government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting. The amount of this creative accounting depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the European Union. We find that the SGP rules have induced governments to use stock-flow adjustments, a form of creative accounting, to hide deficits. This tendency to substitute stock-flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.
Subjects: 
Fiscal rules
stock-flow adjustments
debt-deficit adjustments
stability and growth pact
excessive deficit procedure
ESA 95
JEL: 
H62
H70
H61
E62
H63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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