Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19483 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series 1 No. 2004,16
Publisher: 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
We test recent theories of when companies go public which predict that 1) more companies will go public when outside valuations are high or have increased, 2) companies prefer going public when uncertainty about their future profitability is high, and 3) firms whose controlling shareholders enjoy large private benefits of control are less likely to go public. Our analysis tracks a set of 330 privately-held German firms which between 1984 and 1995 announced their intention to go public to see whether, when, and how they subsequently sold equity to outside investors. Controlling for private benefits, we find that the likelihood of firms completing an initial public offering increases in the firm's investment opportunities and valuations. We also show that these effects are distinct from factors that increase firms' demand for outside capital more generally.
Subjects: 
Going public decision
IPO timing
Private benefits
Family firms
JEL: 
G32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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