Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194249
Authors: 
Hamoudi, Hamid
Rodríguez, Isabel
Martín-Bustamante, Marcos Sanz
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 44 [Year:] 2017 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 33-51
Abstract: 
This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium outcome is then found for both spatial configurations. When the regulator is inclined to favor consumers (consumer-oriented) both firms are restricted to locate at one point to serve the whole market. Nevertheless, when the preferences of the regulator are biased towards firms (firm-oriented) the zoning area is maximized, with both firms being located at the market boundaries. The equilibrium outcome confirms location patterns found in real life situations under a non-neutral regulator.
Subjects: 
Zoning
spatial competition
welfare function
equilibrium results
industrial policy
JEL: 
C72
D47
D60
L51
L13
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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