Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194175 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2018/6
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
The paper discusses the problem of valuation in bank resolution. In an overview over the most relevant principles of valuation theory, the paper notes the difficulties inherent in valuing risks and illiquidity in holding non-traded assets. Subsequently, the paper briefly reviews the resolution of Banco Popular Español, and then discusses the need for clarification of the no-investor-worse-off principle, the relation between the price in a sale of business and the presumed outcome in an insolvency procedure, and the difficulties attached to assessing the value of an illiquid asset that is held. The paper concludes with a discussion of the need for time, for valuation and in resolution, warns against a moratorium on withdrawals and payouts, and argues that time pressures would be much reduced if funding in resolution was provided for.
Subjects: 
bank resolution
valuation
no-investor-worse-off principle
Banco Popular Español
JEL: 
G21
G28
G33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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