Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194000 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2018-208
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
We use a range of dictator game experiments to investigate whether people avoid information altruistically. After learning about a product with positive externalities, a consumer may avoid learning the cost of the product so that she does not hesitate to act altruistically. We find that although a few altruistic people avoid information about their own costs, this does not change the overall rate of altruistic behavior. The result suggests that although concealing costs upfront might make a few people let go of learning them, it does not increase the rate of altruistic behavior.
Subjects: 
Pro-social behavior
Self-Image
Information Avoidance
Moral Wiggle Room
JEL: 
C91
D64
D83
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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