Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/193681 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2019-301
Publisher: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Abstract: 
In this paper, we design an investment game which allows us to study the influence of selection when learning from others. Using the theoretical study of selection neglect in Jehiel (2018) as a guide, we test (i) for the presence of selection neglect in this investment context, and (ii) some comparative static predictions of the model. We find strong evidence for selection neglect—even though subjects are fully informed about the data generating process. As theoretically predicted, the degree of bias due to selection neglect increases when other decision makers become more informed, or become more rational. It decreases when signals are correlated.
Subjects: 
selection neglect
beliefs
overconfidence
experiment
survivorship bias
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C11
C90
D80
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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