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Autoren: 
Barron, Kai
Huck, Steffen
Jehiel, Philippe
Datum: 
2019
Reihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2019-301
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we design an investment game which allows us to study the influence of selection when learning from others. Using the theoretical study of selection neglect in Jehiel (2018) as a guide, we test (i) for the presence of selection neglect in this investment context, and (ii) some comparative static predictions of the model. We find strong evidence for selection neglect—even though subjects are fully informed about the data generating process. As theoretically predicted, the degree of bias due to selection neglect increases when other decision makers become more informed, or become more rational. It decreases when signals are correlated.
Schlagwörter: 
selection neglect
beliefs
overconfidence
experiment
survivorship bias
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C11
C90
D80
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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