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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ursprung, Heinrich W. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:57:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:57:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) |cHamburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aHWWA Discussion Paper |x193 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political competition | en |
dc.subject.keyword | lobbying | en |
dc.subject.keyword | interest groups | en |
dc.subject.keyword | campaign contributions | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlkampffinanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Lobbying and political polarization | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 356976149 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219 | en |
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