Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354
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dc.contributor.authorUrsprung, Heinrich W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:57:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:57:30Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19354-
dc.description.abstractStandard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aHamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) |cHamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aHWWA Discussion Paper |x193en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcampaign contributionsen_US
dc.subject.stw├ľkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWahlkampffinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLobbying and political polarizationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn356976149en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219-

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