Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193541
Authors: 
Schoenmaker, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
ESRB Working Paper Series 34
Abstract: 
The stability of a banking system ultimately depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop. While large countries can still afford to resolve large global banks on their own, small and medium-sized countries face a policy choice. This paper investigates the impact of resolution on banking structure. The financial trilemma model indicates that smaller countries can either conduct joint supervision and resolution of their global banks (based on single point of entry resolution) or reduce the size of their global banks and move to separate resolution of these banks' national subsidiaries (based on multiple point of entry resolution). Euro-area countries are heading for joint resolution based on burden sharing, while the UK and Switzerland have implemented policies to downsize their banks.
Subjects: 
Global Financial Architecture
International Banks
Burden Sharing
Resolution Planning
Single Point of Entry
Multiple Point of Entry
JEL: 
F30
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-95081-93-2
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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