Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19347 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
HWWA Discussion Paper No. 185
Verlag: 
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Central bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis : A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is good when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate. However, a very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization Undesirable. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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