Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/193377 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 12083
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study a Singaporean drug-selling gang's dataset and empirically find that the gang's pushers purchased larger quantities of drugs during periods of enforcement shocks caused by enforcement activities targeting the gang's drug supply chain. This counter-intuitive finding can be explained by the pushers' profit targeting behavior. Given that enforcement shocks increased the pushers' cost of drugs, pushers must compensate by purchasing more drugs to sell in order to reach their profit targets.
Subjects: 
crime
enforcement
labor supply
JEL: 
J46
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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