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Autoren: 
Hunold, Matthias
Schlütter, Frank
Datum: 
2019
Reihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 309
Zusammenfassung: 
The established literature on partial vertical ownership has derived distinct pro- and anti-competitive effects, depending on whether the upstream or the downstream firm holds the shares (forward or backward). We show that forward ownership can have the same effects as backward ownership (and vice versa) when it entails both profit and control rights. Moreover, we demonstrate novel anti-competitive effects of partial ownership that arise when the upstream tariffs are non-linear. This contrasts well-established findings that are based on linear tariffs and adds to the current debate on how to treat partial shareholdings in merger control.
Schlagwörter: 
corporate influence
financial interest
minority shareholding
partial ownership
JEL: 
L22
L40
L8
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-308-7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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