Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/193188
Authors: 
Hunold, Matthias
Schlütter, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper 309
Abstract: 
The established literature on partial vertical ownership has derived distinct pro- and anti-competitive effects, depending on whether the upstream or the downstream firm holds the shares (forward or backward). We show that forward ownership can have the same effects as backward ownership (and vice versa) when it entails both profit and control rights. Moreover, we demonstrate novel anti-competitive effects of partial ownership that arise when the upstream tariffs are non-linear. This contrasts well-established findings that are based on linear tariffs and adds to the current debate on how to treat partial shareholdings in merger control.
Subjects: 
corporate influence
financial interest
minority shareholding
partial ownership
JEL: 
L22
L40
L8
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-308-7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
762.13 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.