Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192916 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 307
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such "naive" consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the high-type seller to use them as a costly signal of his product's quality to rational consumers.
Schlagwörter: 
Censorship
dynamic games
disclosure
moderated learning
JEL: 
D82
D83
D90
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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