Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192841 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 859
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
We study the relationship between early claiming of pensions and incentives in the highly flexible Norwegian public pension system, measuring incentives to claim based on an estimated model for expected longevity. Despite a strong correlation between incentives and claiming decisions, the additional costs to public budgets arising from this selection turn out to be modest. Based on analyses exploiting only variation in expected pensions generated by variation in parental longevities and only claiming of pensions not in conjunction with retirement, we conclude that part of the selection is active: Some individuals claim pensions early because they gain from doing so.
Subjects: 
social security
pension benefits
retirement
annuity
JEL: 
H55
J14
J26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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