Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192662 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 680
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on compliance, but an audit raises the firm's subsequent compliance substantially.
Subjects: 
environmental regulation
enforcement
EPA
natural field experiment
random assignment
JEL: 
K42
C93
Q58
D21
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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